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ALEXANDER N. SONGORWA, TON BUHRS, & KEN
F.D. HUGHEY*

Community-Based Wildlife
Management in Africa: A Critical
Assessment of the Literature
ABSTRACT
The protectionistapproachto wildlife conservationhas been blamed
by some conservationistsfor failing to protect wildlife and its
habitats, especially in Africa. The failure of this approach has
triggered a rush by conservationists to find alternatives. One
alternative that has gained support is the Community-Based
Wildlife Management(CWM) approach.Fourassumptionsunderlie CWM: (1) that the nationalgovernments and their wildlife
authoritiesare willing to devolve ownership of and management
responsibilitiesfor, wildlife to rural communities; (2) that the
communities are interested to participatein managingwildlife; (3)
that the communities have the capability to manage wildlife; and
(4) that wildlife conservationand ruraleconomic development are
compatible. The ideaof CWM is put to the test by bringingtogether
the existingviews on the approachand assessingthe plausibilityof
the four assumptions on the basis of the literature.Although the
aim of CWM-to address the failures of fences-and-fnes--is
laudable, the four assumptions are problematic. The approach is,
therefore, less effective than it is saidto be.
I.

BACKGROUND

When colonial governments were established in Africa, they placed
the control and management of all wildlife and the lands on which it
existed under state ownership. Local communities were, in all except a few
cases, forcibly relocated and alienated from the resources they, or their
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chiefs, formerly had the right to own and control.' The argument for this
was that they did not have the knowledge, the will, or the training to
manage the wildlife in a sustainable way.2
Post-colonial governments continued to embrace and carry on
colonial preservation policies.3 The tendency was, or has been, for
conservationists, through the respective governments and their wildlife
authorities, to unilaterally expand the protected areas or establish new
ones.4 Communities around these protected areas were seen as the
principal threat to wildlife, and the governments, wildlife authorities in
particular, focused their attention on barring members of the community
from disturbing the areas and the wildlife therein. Some governments went
to the extreme. For instance, the Zimbabwean and Kenyan6 governments
adopted "shoot-on-sight" or "shoot-to-kill" as their official policy against
poaching. As a result, there have been many casualties on both sides due
to the exchange of gunfire between park/game rangers and the poachers.
In its struggle to preserve wildlife, therefore, the protectionist approach
(commonly known as the fences-and-fines approach) caused skepticism,
lack of trust, and even hatred between wildlife authorities and the
communities in wildlife areas.7 Yet there is a growing consensus, especially
among conservationists and international conservation organizations, that
the protectionist approach has failed to protect the wildlife in Africa.8
1. See Robert K. Hitchcock, Centralization,Resource Depletion,and Coercive Conservation
Among the Tyua of the NortheasternKalahari,23 HUM. ECOLOGY 169,169-72 (1995); MICHAEL
WELLS ET AL., PEOPLE AND PARKS: LINKING PROTECTED AREA MANAGEMENT WITH LOCAL

COMMUNITIES 8 (1992).
2. See INT'L INST. FOR ENV'T & DEV., WHOSE EDEN? AN OVERVIEW OF COMMUNITY
APPROACHES TO WILDLIFE MANAGEMENT 55-56 (1994) [hereinafter IIED].

3. See Nontokozo Nabane & Gordon Matzke, A Gender-Sensitive Analysis of a
Community-Based Wildlife UtilizationInitiativein Zimbabwe's Zambezi Valley, 10 SOC'Y&NAT.
RESOuRCES 519, 519 (1997);Owen J.Lynch &Janis B. Alcorn, TenurialRights and CommunityBased Conservation, in NATURAL CONNECTIONS: PERSPECTIVES IN COMMUNITY-BASED
CONSERVATION 373,378-80 (David Western & R. Michael Wright eds., 1994).
4. See Nabane & Matzke, supra note 3, at 519-20; Hitchcock, supra note 1, at 169-70.
5. See LOUIS LIEBENBERG & DAVID GROSSMAN, TOWARDS A NEW NATURE CONSERVATION POLICY: DISCUSSION DOCUMENT PREPARED FOR THE LAPC 8 (Land and Agriculture

Policy Centre, South Africa, 1994).
6. See Hitchcock, supra note 1, at 170.
7. See Robert M. Muth &John F. Bowe Jr., Illegal Harvestof Renewable Natural Resources
in North America: Toward a Typology of the Motivations for Poaching, 11 SOC'Y & NAT.
RESOURCES 9, 10, 18-20 (1998).

8. See ChristopherB. Barrett& Ray Grizzle, A HolisticApproach to SustainabilityBased
on Pluralism Stewardship, 21 ENVTL. ETHICS 23, 27 (1999); Christopher B. Barrett & Peter
Arcese, Are Integrated Conservation-Development Projects (ICDPs) Sustainable? On the
Conservation of Large Mammals in Sub-Saharan Africa, 23 WORLD DEV. 1073, 1073 (1995);
Gordon Edwin Matzke &Nontokozo Nabane, Outcomes of a Community Controlled Wildlife
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Due to the perceived failure of the fences-and-fines approach, since
the late 1970s and early 1980s conservationists have been urged to search
for alternatives9 or, as Siachoono calls it, to find a "lasting solution."10 A
growing realization among conservationists of the importance of understanding the needs and perspectives of human communities in wildlife
areas, of interactive communication, and of building or strengthening
community-level institutional capacity to manage wildlife" led to the
emergence of two main participatory approaches-passive and active.
The passive participatory approach is known as Community
Conservation Services (CCS).12 It is an initiative in which, like the fencesand-fines approach, local communities are perceived to be not only
powerless and passive actors, but also beneficiaries.13 CCS focuses on
disseminating conservation ethics through education as a means of
facilitating externally planned and designed programs. Contribution from
the "target" communities is limited to provision of information and labor.14
In return, the management. authorities of neighboring protected areas
allocate funds to communities from wildlife revenues and/or external
sources to be used for infrastructural development projects such as
construction or repair of school and dispensary buildings and roads. CCS
programs/projects are meant to compensate the communities for their loss
of access to wildlife and other costs they incur. The programs/projects
intend to reduce local opposition to protected areas, to remove the
(economic) incentives for community members to poach and destroy

UtilizationProgramin a Zambezi Valley Community, 24 HUM. ECOLOGY 65,83 (1996); Nabane
& Matzke, supra note 3, at 519; Hitchcock, supra note 1, at 194-95.
9. See e.g.,ShishirR. Raval, Wheel of Life: Perceptionsand Concerns of the Resident Peoples
for GirNationalPark in India, 7 SOC'Y & NAT. RESOURCES 305,305-06 (1994); David Western,
Ecosystem Conservation and Rural Development: The Case of Amboseli, in NATURAL
CONNECTIONS: PERSPECTIVES IN COMMUNrIY-BASED CONSERVATION, supranote 3, at 15,15.
See generally Milton M.R. Freeman, Graphs and Gaffs: A Cautionary Tale in the CommonProperty Resources Debate, in COMMON PROPERTY RESOURCES: ECOLOGY AND COMMUNITYBASED SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 92 (Fikret Berkes ed., 1989); Henry A. Regier et al.,
Reforming the Use of Natural Resources, in COMMON PROPERTY RESOURCES: ECOLOGY AND

COMMUNITY-BASED SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 110 (Fikret Berkes ed., 1989).
10. Stanford M. Siachoono, Contingent Valuation as an Additional Tool for Evaluating
Wildlife UtilizationManagement in Zambia: Mumbwa Game Management Area, 24 AMBIO 246,
246 (1995).
11. See IED, supra note 2, at 19-20, 56-57.
12. SeePatrick Joseph Bergin, Conservation and Development- The Institutionalisation
of Community Conservation in Tanzania National Parks ii, 23 (1995) (unpublished Ph.D.
thesis, University of East Anglia) (on file with the University of East Anglia).
13. See id. at 23.
14. See Edmund Barrow, et al., The Peoples' Voice: Partnership and Community
Conservation,in INTEGRATING PEOPLE AND WILDLIFE FOR A SUSTAINABLE FUrURE 255,255-57

(Joan A. Bissonette & Paul R. Krausman eds., 1995).
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wildlife habitats, and to improve relationships between the communities
and the managers of protected areas."5
The search for a "lasting solution" involved more soul-searching:
the conservationists retraced their footsteps further and went back to their
perceived "enemies," asked for forgiveness, and proposed cooperation,
partnership, and the equitable sharing of the costs and benefits of wildlife.1
They named this activeparticipatory approach Community-Based Wildlife
Management (CWM), which is also called Community-Based Conservation (CBC)," "more progressive passive participation initiatives,"19
"conservation through use,"' and "conservation through self-determination." 21 The underlying thinking of CWM is that local communities have
been alienated from a resource they should rightfully own, control,
manage, and benefit from.
Most participatory wildlife management programs are neither
passive nor active, as they tend to combine initiatives associated with
both.' However, in the more active approach (CWM), communities are
perceived not as mere beneficiaries, but as active participants capable of
carrying out wildlife management activities. Unlike CCS, CWM aims at
empowering and actively involving communities in the whole process of
wildlife conservation-from problem identification through planning and
designing programs/projects to implementing and evaluating them.
Therefore, an important goal for CWM is to create, through an active
participatory approach and cooperation between communities and the
respective governments, conditions whereby a maximum number of

15. See IED, supra note 2, at 57.
16. See AlexanderNyangero Songorwa, Community-Based Wildlife Management: The
Case Study of Selous Conservation Program in Tanzania 3 (1999) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis,
Lincoln University, New Zealand) (on file with Lincoln University, New Zealand).
17. See Edward B. Barbier, Community-BasedDevelopment in Africa, in ECONOMICS FOR
THE WILDS: WILDLIFE, DIVERSITY, AND DEVELOPMENT 103, 105 (Timothy M. Swanson &
Edward B. Barbiereds., 1992); THE WORLD BANKTECHNICALREPoRT No. 130, LIVING WITH
WILDLIFE: WILDLIFE RESOURCE MANAGEMENT WITH LOCAL PARTICIPATION IN AFRICA iv-v
(Agnes Kiss ed., 1990) [hereinafter LIVING wrrH WiLDLIFE].

18. See David Western & R. Michael Wright, The Background to Community-Based
Conservation, in

NATURAL

CONNECTIONS:

PERSPECTIVES

IN

COMMUNITY-BASED

CONSERVATION, supranote 3, at 1, 1.
19. IIED, supra note 2, at 57.
20.

MARSHALL W. MURPHREE, COMMUNAL LAND WILDLIFE RESOURCES AND RURAL

D-TRICT COUNCIL REVENUES 5 (Centre for Applied Social Sciences Occasional Paper No.
51/93,1993).
21. David Hyndman, Conservation through Self-Determination: Promotingthe

Interdependenceof Culturaland Biological Diversity, 53 HUM. ORG. 296,300 (1994).
22. See IIED, supra note 2, at 57-58. See generally Arnold Hughes, AlternativeForms and
Levels ofPopularParticipation:
A General Survey, in POPULAR PARTICIPATIONINPLANNING FOR
BASIC NEEDS: CONCEPTS, METHODS AND PRACTICES 52 (Franklyn Lisk ed., 1985).
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people in wildlife areas benefit, both directly and indirectly, from the
sustainable management and utilization of wildlife.' Legal ownership (or
at least user rights), control, and management responsibilities for wildlife
must be devolved by the respective governments to communities.
Proponents of CWM argue that this is a crucial step because it restores a
sense of ownership and responsibility for the resource among community
members.24
Both passive and active participatory approaches borrow principles
from the older concepts of sustainable development and integrated rural
development, which demand "that natural resources be used to improve
human welfare." ' One principle common to both approaches is that of
meeting basic needs of the local people.2 In rural Africa common basic
needs include, but are not limited to, food, clothing, shelter, safe drinking
water, educational and health facilities, sanitation, and electricity.
However, CWM (the active participatory approach) has adopted
two additional principles: (1) putting resources under local controlV7 and
(2) giving local communities a decisive voice and representation through
their own local institutions, which means participationin making decisions
that affect them. ' The latter principle intends to increase trust and
confidence and strengthen leadership capabilities at the community level.
By adopting the first principle above, both passive and active participatory
approaches intend to pass a share of wildlife benefits to local communities.
However, the most distinctive feature of the active participatory approach
is that communities
shoulder "a greater portion of the costs of managing
29
wildlife."
Although CWM is mainly concerned with wildlife conservation,
potentially it has political, social, and institutional implications beyond
wildlife conservation. As part of the advocacy for popular participation in
development, the approach has the potential of becoming a catalyst for
socio-political and institutional changes in the communities where it is

23.

SeeJAMESA. BAILEY, PRINCIPLEOFWILDLIFEMANAGEMEFNT9-14, 337,342-44(1984);

ROBERT H. GILES, JR., WILDLIFE MANAGEMENT 10-28 (1978).

24.
25.

See IIED,supra note 2, at 64,68.
Nick Salafsky, EcologicalLimitsand OpportunitiesforCommunity-Based Conservation,

in NATURALCONNECTIONS:

PERSPECTIVES IN COMMUNITY-BASEDCONSERVATION, supra note

3, at 448, 448.
26. See RICHARD FITTER, WILDLIFE FORMAN: HOW AND WHY WE SHOULD CONSERVE OUR
SPECIES 172 (1986); Golam M. Mathbor, The ImportanceofCommunity Participationin Coastal
Zone Management: a Bangladesh Perspective,32 COMMUNITY DEV. J. 124,124-25 (1997).
27. See JON MORIS, MANAGING INDUCED RURAL DEVELOPMENT 4 (1981).

28. See BacksonM.C. Sibanda, Environment,Development, and Local Governancein Africa:
A Case Study of CAMPFIRE in Zimbabwe, 17 REGIONAL DEV. DIALOGUE 118,122,126 (1996);
JOHN FRIEDMANN, EMPOWERMENP: THE POLmCS OF ALTERNAT7VE DEVELOPMENT 35 (1992).
29. IIED, supra note 2, at 34.
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introduced, and may spread to other parts of the country and lead to a
demand for an even greater devolution of power. This is not the subject of
this paper but it is a potential area for further research.
The literature portrays CWM as something that has been redeemed
or revived. Its proponents argue that from their pre-colonial practices, local

communities have accumulated the knowledge and gained the capability
to manage wildlife. They argue further that before the communities were
alienated from wildlife they, under their chiefs, managed it in a sustainable
way." This gives the impression that before the communities were
alienated they practiced active wildlife management, but this is not
necessarily the case. In pre-colonial times African communities did not
manage wildlife as such. They only harvested it depending upon availability and according to local beliefs, customs, and taboos. Most of these

beliefs, customs, and taboos were not intended as conservation measures. 1
There was little or no over-exploitation only because the harvesting
technologies were inefficient and human populations were small.
Therefore, what contemporary rural African communities are
asked or expected to do under CWM is new to them, and would have been

new also to their predecessors. In pre-colonial times they harvested wildlife

mainly for family subsistence. 2 Commercial use existed, but was minimal
and often localized. But CWM is targeting not families or clans (the precolonial, more homogeneous communities with genetically related
members) but a single village or groups of villages. Most of these are
artificial groupings that never existed in pre-colonial times. For instance,
in Tanzania they are a result of colonial and post-colonial state policies and
resettlement programs. Also, CWM is not meant for local people to subsist
on wildlife. Neither is it for cultural, moral, spiritual, religious, or aesthetic
purposes. It is for the protection of biodiversity but through economic
incentives or profit making.' It is about managing wildlife for an external
market-tourists and sport-hunters from affluent countries 3 -because,
according to its proponents, "wildlife [must]...pay its way." 's

30. See, e.g., Marshall W. Murphree, The Role of Institutions in Community-Based
Conservation, in NATURAL CONNECTIONS: PERSPECTIVES IN COMMUNITY-BASED
CONSERVATION, supranote 3, at 403, 404.

31.

See lIED, supra note 2, at 13.

32.

See Western, supra note 9, at 20-21.

33. See Kevin A. Hill, Zimbabwe's Wildlife UtilizationPrograms:GrassrootsDemocracy or
an Extension of State Power?, APR. STUD. REv., Apr. 1996, at 103, 109, 113; B.J. Kelso,

Environment:The Ivory Controversy, AFR. REP., Mar.-Apr. 1995, at 50,52,54-55; LIEBENBERG
&GROSSMAN, supra note 5, at 5-7.
34.

34 See LIVING WITH WILDLIFE, supra note 17, at 2-3, 10, 17.

35. Western, supra note 9, at 28.
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In pre-colonial Africa, wildlife harvesting centered on survival of
the family or clan. There was no accounting system. The accounting
systems (financial and other) accompanying CWM are new and, in most
cases, too demanding for the illiterate and semi-illiterate community
members. Also, in the pre-colonial harvesting regimes wildlife was not
guarded in the way it is supposed to be guarded under CWM-by paid
and armed personnel. Whereas the pre-colonial harvesting practices
strengthened relationships between family and clan members, CWM tends
to "create a small class of salaried locals at the expense of the rest of the
community, which in some cases leads to a deterioration in community
relations."' It means, therefore, that CWM is a new invention. It does not
have roots in African communities, neither inpre-colonial communities nor
in those we see today. The approach is new also because, unlike the precolonial harvesting practices which involved only the communities, it
involves multiple interest groups or stakeholders such as international
conservation organizations and conservation interest groups in Western
countries, or what Physick calls "off-shore NGOs,"37 some of whom the
communities have never heard of and are unlikely to come into contact
with.
II. ORIGIN AND RATIONALE FOR CWM
The CWM approach has two main components-wildlife
conservation and community economic development-and its origin can
be explained in two different ways, conceptually and politically. Conceptually, it can again be said to have a dual origin. First is the shift in environmental politics during the 1970s and 1980s from the "exclusionist paradigm," which assumed an infinite supply of natural resources and
excluded human beings from the laws of nature, to an "alternative
paradigm," which argues, among other things, that the supply of resources
is limited. The "alternative paradigm" stresses the formulation and
implementation of ecologically sound policies.'
Second is the new development concept, which emphasizes such
matters as public involvement, cooperative management, power sharing,

36. lIED, supra note 2, at 26.
37. Ron E. Physick, ConservationoutsideNatureReserves in SouthernAfrica with KwazuluNatal a Case Study, in CONSERVATION OUTSIDENATURE RESERVES 84,84 (PeterHale &David
Lamb eds., 1997).
38.

See GARETH PORTER &JANETWELSH BROWN,GLOBALENVIRONMENTALPOLrICS 27-

32(1991).
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devolution, empowerment, and participatory democracy,39 and demands
a shift from concerns about wildlife to broader concerns about the wellbeing of people. At the same time, a group of conservationists argued that
the fences-and-fines approach has failed mainly because of its top-down
nature, and because it failed to take into account economic and other
interests of local communities, or to involve them in making wildliferelated decisions.' These proponents believe that, as a result, the fencesand-fines approach lost support and commitment from the communities 1
Therefore, CWM is part of an application of the growing interest by
development organizations, theoreticians, and practitioners in the general
approach to community development, 2 and the interestby conservationists
to protect biological diversity outside protected-area boundaries. 3
In terms of political origin of the approach there have been
contradicting views. Possibly basing their argument on the fact that there
were wildlife harvesting regimes in pre-colonial Africa, some writers such
as Raybourn" and Matzke and Nabane" claim that the approach is a result
of"African initiatives." But most of the literature points to the international
arena as the origin of this approach." For instance, opposing the
"Africanisation" of this and other contemporary conservation policies,
Chidumayo argues that "the only thing that is African about most
conventional conservation policies is that they are practiced on African

39. See Lawrence P. Hildebrand, Introduction to the Special Issue on Community-Based
CoastalManagement, 36 OCEAN & COASTAL MGMT. 1, 1 (1997). See generally FRIEDMANN,
supra note 28.
40. See Barbier, supra note 17, at 103-05.
41. See Western, supra note 9, at 21-22, 35-39. See generally IUCN-THE WORLD
CONSERVATIONUNION,3PROTECTEDAREASOFTHEWORLD:A REVIEWOFNATIONALSYSTEMS

AFROTROPICAL (1991).

42. See Bill Derman, EnvironmentalNGOs, Dispossession,and the State: The Ideology and
Praxisof African Nature and Development, 23 HUM. ECOLOGY 199, 200-01 (1995).
43. See J. Peter Brosius et al., Representing Communities: Histories and Politicsof
Community-Based Natural Resource Management, 11 SOC'Y & NAT. RESOURCES 157, 159-60
(1998); HED, supra note 2, at 8.
44. See Jon E. Raybourn, Communal Wildlife Utilizationin Zimbabwe, in INTEGRATING
14, at 44, 44-45.
See Matzke & Nabane, supra note 8, at 66,81.
See Benjamin L. Crosby, Policy Implementation: The OrganizationalChallenge, 24

PEOPLE AND WILDLIFE FOR A SUSTAINABLE FUTURE, supra note

45.
46.

WORLD DEv. 1403, 1403 (1996); Hill, supra note 33, at 108-10; Marshall W. Murphree,
Approaches to Community Participation,in AFRICAN WILDLIFE POUCY CONSULTATION: FINAL
REPORT OF THE CONSULTATION 155,157 (Overseas Dev. Admin. ed., 1996); Derman, supra
note 42, at 200-01; Clark C. Gibson & Stuart A. Marks, Transforming Rural Hunters into
Conservationists:An Assessment ofCommunity-Based Wildlife Management Programsin Africa,

23 WORLD DEV. 941, 941 (1995); Siachoono, supra note 10, at 246-47; IIED, supra note 2, at
17-18, 56-58; Western, supra note 9, at 31; WELLS ET AL., supra note 1, at 1-2.
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land."47 The international conservation organizations, donor agencies, and
Western states act partly on their own but mostly as a response to
pressures fromnational and international environmental and conservation
pressure groups."
Why are international conservation organizations and donor
agencies urging African countries to adopt CWM? What are the rationales
for this new approach? The main rationale is effectiveness. Proponents of
CWM argue that the communities are better placed for wildlife management than governments. They explain that when conservation is
community-based, "it limits the number ofstakeholders"' and intra-group
conflicts,;' thus making inclusion and exclusion rules-control over
access--easier to enforce." Proponents say that without the continuous
watchful attention of other community members, individuals' sense of
responsibility disappears.' But the question remains whether CWM is
indeed more effective than the fences-and-fines approach.
There are rationales for CWM also related to arguments about
knowledge, community rights, and economics. The first is use of traditional
wildlife knowledge. Proponents of CWM argue that "local people are the.
most familiar with the area and the wildlife within it,"' and that when
conservation is community-based, it becomes easier to put into use
people's traditional knowledge.5' The second rationale is based on the
rights of the community. Proponents of CWM argue that when conservation is community-based it restores common rights and responsibilitiess,

47. Ramachandra Guha, The Authoritarian Biologist and the Arrogance of Anti-Humanism:

Wildlife Conservation in the Third World, 27 ECOLOGIST 14, 16 (1997).
48. See Jonathan Hutton et al., Conservation and Development Compromised by Animal
Welfare, in INTEGRATING PEOPLE AND WILDLIFE FORA SUSTAINABLE FUTURE, supra note 14, at
271, 271, 274; SHIRLEY L. ZIMMERMAN, UNDERSTANDING FAMILY POLICY: THEORIES AND
APPLICATIONS 85-87 (2d ed. 1995); Sheldon Kamienieckl, Emerging Forces in Global
Environmental Politics, in ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS IN THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA:
MOVEMENTS, PARTIES, ORGANIZATIONS, AND POLICY 1, 1 (Sheldon Kamleniecki ed., 1993).

49.

David Western, Linking Conservation and Community Aspirations, in NATURAL

CONNECTIONS: PERSPECTIVES INCOMMUNITY-BASED CONSERVATION, supra note 3, at 499,504.
50. See Shirley C. Strum, Lessons Learned, in NATURAL CONNECTIONS: PERSPECTIVES IN
COMMUNITY-BASED CONSERVATION, supra note 3, at 512,515-16.

51. See Sibanda, supra note 28, at 121-22; J.I. Barnes, Economic Analysis of CommunityBased Wildlife Utilisation Initiatives in Botswana, 12 DEv. S. APR. 783, 786-87 (1995).
52. See Murphree, supra note 46, at 158,162-64; Strum, supra note 50, at 512-13.
53. Barbier, supra note 17, at 131.
54. See Brosius et al., supra note 43, at 163-64; Joanna C. Durbin & Jonny A. Ralambo,
The Role of Local People in the Successful Maintenance of Protected Areas in Madagascar, 21
ENVTL CONSERVATION 115,116 (1994); LIVING WITH WILDLIFE, supra note 17, at 20-21.

55. See Ken Worpole, A Green Space beyond Self-Interest: In the Search for Social Forms that
Value Conservation and Equitable Sharing of Scarce Resources, the Ancient Commons Hold
Intriguing Clues, NEW STATESMAN, May 30, 1997, at 30,30-31 (1997).
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But CWM is also part of the wider advocacy for popular participation in
developments ' and arguably an element of a democratization and
decentralization process. The third is an economic rationale. At the
community level, production and surpluses from wildlife use are supposedly maximized, thereby providing economic incentives for the community
to maintain control over access.' It is also argued that where exclusion is
successful, the value of land increases' and prices for wildlife emerge,
without which "the resource is effectively valueless in the eyes of the
landholders who determine the fate of the resource on their land."5 CWM
is believed to reduce the costs of management and law enforcement.
Since its conception, CWM has gained momentum and spread61
quickly, generating "cheerleading" attitudes3 and "a rush of optimism"
among conservationists, international conservation organizations,
development practitioners, and aid agencies. But its proponents realized
that to bring about a change of direction they needed the support and
commitment of the respective governments. They had to convince or even
force those governments, through institutional pressure and offers of aid
packages, to accept the new approach.'
But the adoption of the concept of community participation in
wildlife conservation has divided conservationists into two opposing
groups: one praising it and the other (much smaller group) criticizing it as
idealistic and impractical.' Few writers have questioned openly the
practicability and sustainability of CWM." This skeptical group argues that
CWM may be too idealistic. But their skepticism and questioning have been

56. SeegenerallyRachel Slocum& Barbara Thomas-Slayter, Participation,Empowerment,
and Sustainable Development, in POWER, PROCESS AND PARTICIPATION: TOOLS FOR CHANGE 3
(Rachel Slocum et al. eds., 1995).
57. See Barnes, supra note 51,786-87.
58. See Espen Sjaastad & Daniel W. Bromley, Indigenous Land Rights in Sub-Saharan
Africa: Appropriation,Security and Investment Demand, 25 WORLD DEv. 549, 558 (1997).
59. Brian Child, Conservation beyond Yellowstone: An Economic Framework of Wildlife
Conservation, in AFRICAN WILDLIFE POLICY CONSULTATION:
CONSULTATION, supra note 46, at 55, 57.

FINAL REPORT OF THE

60. Hill, supranote 33, at 112.
61. Western & Wright, supra note 18, at 10.
62. See Songorwa, supra note 16, at 3.
63. There is a variety of ideas and claims regarding CWM. Although all CWM
programs strive to reconcile wildlife conservation and rural economic development, they
differ from one another depending on their initiator(s), implementers, and the political,
social, economic, and geophysical contexts in which they are implemented.
64. See, e.g., Barrett & Arcese, supra note 8, at 1073; Gibson & Marks, supra note 46, at

942; Kelso, supra note 33, at 52; Peter D. Little, The Link Between Local Participationand
Improved Conservation: A Review of Issues and Experiences, in NATURAL CONNECTIONS:
PERSPECTIVES IN COMMUNITY-BASED CONSERVATION, supra note 3, at 347, 347-49.

Summer 2000]

COMMUNITY-BASED WILDLIFE MANAGEMENT

613

attacked by proponents who accuse them of taking a "short-term view,"'
of being academics who lack hands-on experience in wildlife management,
and of "factual inaccuracies and [making] misleading assumptions."" These
proponents also say that this skepticism and questioning is unhealthy,
unsound, and unable to help to "separate the wheat from the chaff. "67 But
they admit that the principle of community participation, which the CWM
approach has borrowed from the concepts of "sustainable development"
and "integrated rural development,"' is an ambiguous one.'
Herein, we intend to contribute to this debate by assessing some
of the assumptions that underlie the CWM approach. In particular, we
focus on the role of powers of governments, community interest and
willingness, community capability, and the compatibility between wildlife
conservation and rural economic development.
III. ASSUMPTIONS UNDERLYING CWM
In the literature on CWM, four (often implicit) assumptions that
underlie the approach can be identified. First, that governments are
interested and committed to its implementation. In particular, because of
their limited capacities in terms of finances, staff, and required information
to fight poaching and all other wildlife conservation problems, it is
assumed that national governments and their wildlife authorities are
willing to devolve ownership of, and management responsibilities for,
wildlife to rural communities.
Second, the assumption is made that the communities will have the
incentives to conserve wildlife. This assumption can be derived from the
origin of the approach in "alternative development," which emphasizes
public involvement, cooperative management, power sharing, devolution,
empowerment, and participatory democracy; from the claim that the
approach puts farmers first by adopting the "Basic Needs" approach; and
from a shift in emphasis from concerns about wildlife to broader concerns
about the well-being of people!0
Third, the claim that the approach puts to use the people's
traditional knowledge, the association of the approach with the advocacy

65.

Letter from Dr. Ludwig Siege, Coordinator, TanzaniaSelous ConservationProgram,

to the Director of Wildlife [Tanzania], the Director Planning and Wildlife Management
(PAWM), Mr. Lyamuya, Mr. Ndunguru, the Director of ODA Project, Ruaha, & the Director
Serengeti Regional Conservation Strategy 1 (Mar. 6, 1996) (on file with the author).
66. Murphree, supra note 46, at 158.
67. Id.
68. See Little, supra note 64,at 350; Strum, supra note 50, at 513.
69. See Murphree, supra note 46, at 158.
70. See Brosius et al., supra note 43, at 158.
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for popular participation, and the adoption of the principles of putting
resources under local control and giving local communities a decisive voice
71
all imply that the communities have the capability to manage wildlife.
Fourth, the stated interest of the approach in conserving wildlife
outside protected areas and in meeting the basic needs of the communities
(or improving the communities' economic well-being) implies that the two
aims are compatible.'
We do not claim that these are the only assumptions that underlie
CWM, nor that these are always implicit and not recognized. Sometimes
one or more are explicitly stated in the literature. There are also other
assumptions, for instance, presence of two-way means of communication
and interaction, that could be identified, but we review only the four
mentioned, as they are crucial to all forms of CWM.73 As the "pure,"

71. See id.; Gibson & Marks, supra note 46, at 944.
72. See Murphree, supranote 46, at 164; LIVING WITH WILDLIFE, supra note 17, at iii.
73. There are two different ways of classifying programs that implement the CWM
approach. One is to use location, which gives two forms. In the first form programs are
based on, or associated with, established protected areas-buffer zone programs. Examples
of buffer zone programs in Africa include the Lupande Development Project (LDP) and
Administrative Management Design (ADMADE) in Zambia and many CAMPFIRE projects
in Zimbabwe, especially in the Zambezi Valley. See IIED, supranote 2, at 10, 35,4142; Hill,
supra note 33, at 110-18; Simon Metcalfe, The Zimbabwe Communal Areas Management
Programfor Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE),in NATURAL CONNECTIONS: PERSPECrIVES IN
COMMUNrr -BASEDCONSERVATION, supra note 3, at 161,164-65. The second form of CWM
is not associated with protected areas; the programs are located on communal lands far
from protected areas. Examples from Africa include Community Game Guards inNamibia
and some CAMPFIRE projects in Zimbabwe. See IIED, supra note 2, at 43-46; LIEBENBERG
&GROSSMAN, supra note 5, at 6-7.
CWM programs can also be classified based on the number of parties involved and their
levels of involvement. Like the previous method, this classification gives two (main)
classes. The first is a class of genuine, truly community-based programs based on the
"bottom-up" participatory approach. This is the "ideal" situation whereby communities
initiate their own projects by acquiring legal ownership of and gaining control over
management responsibilities for wildlife on their lands. See Murphree, supranote 30, at 40507; Frances J.Seymour, Are Successful Community-Based Conservation Projects Designed or

Discovered?,in NATURALCONNECTIONS:

PERSPECTIVES INCOMMUNrIY-BASEDCONSERVATION,

supranote 3, at 472,490; LIVING WITH WILDUFE, supra note 17, at 6,10-12,20-24. The second
is a class of joint, cooperative management (co-management) or partnership programs
between communities and the respective governments. See IIED, supra note 2, at 46-54;
LIVING WITH WILDUFE, supra note 17, at 10, 20-24. This method combines "bottom-up" and
"top-down" approaches, but, because of the governments' powerful position (compared
to the communities), it has more of the latter than the former.
Except for the distance from existing protected areas, the difference between buffer zone
programs and non-buffer zone programs is blurred. Both want the communities, at least
in theory, to benefit from wildlife. Both want the communities to control access to wildlife
on their lands by making/adopting and enforcing inclusion and exclusion rules. Also, both
emphasize institutional development and prefer partnership.

Summer 2000]

COMMUNITY-BASED WILDLIFE MANAGEMENT

615

"bottom-up" form of CWM exists only in theory, the four assumptions
above might be considered irrelevant. If that were the case the following
critique would be immaterial. But at least in some degree all forms of CWM
share these assumptions. For instance, with regard to the devolution of
state ownership, control and management responsibilities for wildlife to
the community, the extent of devolution required may differ from one form
to another. Also, since all forms intend to involve the community in
conserving wildlife (though perhaps to different degrees) and direct to

them (differing) portions of wildlife revenues, they all assume that the
target communities have an interest in conserving the wildlife. All forms
assume that the communities have some level of capability to manage
wildlife sustainably. Lastly, as all forms aim to conserve wildlife, and
involve an element of community economic development, they all assume
that the two aims are compatible. It is, therefore, appropriate to assess the
existing forms of CWM based on the four assumptions.
A. Governments and Their Wildlife Authorities Are Willing to
Devolve Ownership and Management Responsibilities for Wildlife to
Communities
Adopting CWM involves deciding "what responsibilities should
go to which institution or level."' In the partnership forms of the approach,
governments are expected to relinquish some, or even most, of their
powers and responsibilities related to wildlife to rural communities.
Decisions related to wildlife management and utilization outside protected
areas have to be made locally, with government agencies participating only
as facilitators, educators, and coordinators. Also, because, in most cases,
existing structures of the agencies do not allow community participation,
restructuring is required. The approach assumes that the governments
agree to transfer ownership of and management responsibilities for wildlife

to communities.
Accounts by Ostrom of T6rbel village in Switzerland, Hirano,
Nagaike, and Yamanoka villages injapan, and Zinjera irrigation communities in the Philippines are evidence that sustainable resource management
is practicable when it is endorsed by local communities. 75 However,
although it may not be the case in all communities, it is explicitly argued
by many proponents of CWM that full endorsement by the communities
is achieved when ownership of, or proprietorship over, the resource(s) is

74. Sibanda, supra note 28, at 127.
75. See ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTn-TIONS
FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 61-69,82-88 (1990).
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in their hands.' This requires the respective government to change its

natural resource and other related policies n to move ownership rights and
control to the communities,7' to secure support and commitment from all
its organs and at all levels (central, regional, district, and lower), and to
adopt an integrated approach among the agencies within and between the
different levels.
It seems logical to expect that governments in Africa would accept
CWM. Why not if, through wildlife utilization, the approach improves the
lives of their people and conserves the wildlife? Why not if the governments have so far failed to accomplish these things through other means?
In practice, however, many governments have been reluctant." Reasons
include (1) the perception that wildlife is a national heritage that must be
protected and managed centrally "for the benefit of the whole nation"' and
its fate determined only by the state, (2) the "bureaucratic impulse" to hold
onto and maximize power,"' and (3) the tendency by those governments to
view popular participation "as politically threatening or economically
damaging."' Governments may be hesitant also because by allowing
they lose control over the locations of (new)
community initiatives
3
developments.!
Also, governments in Africa may be avoiding risks associated with
the gamble in CWM." They do not want to jeopardize the tourism and
sport-hunting industries, which are big sources of foreign exchange.s
Government agencies responsible for the management of wildlife are also
nervous about devolving their authority, whereas the existing wildlife laws

76. See Physick, supra note 37, at 85,87; Murphree, supranote 46, at 162-64; Murphree,
supra note 30, at 406,419-20; Strum, supra note 50, at 516-18; Barbier, supra note 17, at 109;
SHANNA RATNER & PETER IDE, STRATEGIES FOR COMMUNITY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

THROUGH NATURAL RESOURCE USE INNORTHERN NEW YORK 1-4 (1985).

77. See Bergim, supra note 12, at 3-5.
78. See Child, supranote 59, at 56-57; FRIEDMANN, supra note 28, at 31-34; Fikret Berkes
&M. Taghi Farvar, Introductionand Overview, in COMMON PROPERTY RESOURCES: ECOLOGY
AND COMMUNITY-BASED SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, supra note 9, at 1,9-15.
79. See Western, supranote 9, at 3040; Strum, supra note 50, at 515.
80. Barbier, supra note 17, at 131-32.
81. MARSHALL W. MURPHREE, COMMUNITIES AS INSTITUTIONS FOR RESOURCE
MANAGEMENT 9 (Centre for Applied Social Sciences Occasional Paper, 1991).

82. Hughes, supra note 22, at 53.
83. See Hill,supra note 33,at 106-08; Michael McCall &MargaretSkutsch, Strategies and
Contradictions in Tanzania's Rural Development: Which Path for the Peasants?, in RURAL
DEVELOPMENTAND THE STATE: CONTRADICTIONS AND DILEMMASIN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
241,247-51,260-62 (David A.M. Lea & D.P. Chaudhri eds., 1983); MORIS, supra note 27, at
3-4.
84. See Seymour, supra note 73, at 472-73.
85. See Derman, supra note 42, at 204-05.
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make them statutorily responsible for managing wildlife.8' Another
disincentive may be the cost associated with CWM, particularly in terms
of the time required for the process and for managing disagreements
among community members.' Lastly, it should be kept in mind that in
Africa the CWM approach is a result of external demands. For instance, it
is stated in minutes for the 1994 annual national workshop for wildlife
officers in Tanzania that "Most of the Community Conservation projects
in the country are donor initiated and funded. This approach is top-down
and the local institutions.. .and the communities are only passengers while
the donors are doing the steering."m If this is true, then, as Kamieniecki
puts it, "lilt is unrealistic to expect less affluent countries to adopt the
radical.. .reforms being called for by the West.'
The assumption that governments support CWM entails the
existence of favorable policies and legislation. But the approach is
implemented in an uncertain environment, as far as government policies
and legislation are concerned. For instance, in Tanzania, Songorwa found
that until March 1998,10 or 11 years after CWM was first introduced, there
was no policy or law to legitimize it."0 A wildlife policy document existed

only in draft (proposal) form, over eight years since its preparation began
in 1990 (or even earlier).91
Although the Tanzanian government admits in the wildlife policy
document that in the past it made a mistake to alienate rural communities,92
it is not prepared to devolve authority and responsibility for the management of wildlife to local communities. This is evident in that same
document where, in sub-section 3.3.3, it states, as one of its strategies for
conserving and managing wildlife resources, that it will retain the
ownership of and overall responsibilities for management of wildlife in the
country.'3 This means that, unlike proponents of CWM, the Tanzanian
government does not recognize that management of wildlife should be the
responsibility of local communities.

86. See MURPHREE, supra note 20, at 2-3; Seymour, supra note 73, at 484.
87. See Mary Grisez Kweit & Robert W. Kweit, The Politics of Policy Analysis: The Role
of Citizen Participationin Analytic Decision Making, in CITIZEN PARTICIPATION INPUBLIC
DECISION MAKING 19, 22 (Jack DeSario & Stuart Langton eds., 1987).
88. Tanzania Wildlife Dep't, Workshop Minutes from a National Workshop for
Wildlife Officers: National Policy for Wildlife Conservation and Utilisation 13 (Oct. 1994)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the author). See also Barbier, supra note 17, at 107.
89. Kamieniecki, supra note 48, at 13.
90. See Songorwa, supra note 16, at 146.
91. See id.
92. See MINISTRY OF NATURAL RESOURCES & TOURISM, THE WILDLIFE POLICY OF

TANZANIA 7 § 2.9 (1998).
93. See id. at 14 § 3.3.3(ii).
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In 1991, a Presidential Commission on land matters proposed that
powers to manage village land should be vested in village assemblies, but
the Tanzanian government argued that the assemblies were not suitable
organs of land administration.% Coldham believes that the Commission's
recommendations to the government were not going to be implemented
because "it was.. .optimistic to expect the Government to reverse a 30-yearold policy of interventionism and to 'restore' powers of land administration
to panels of elders.' 5 It is perhaps equally optimistic to expect the same
government to reverse a century-old wildlife management system. If it
does not trust the village assemblies to manage lands, it cannot trust them
to manage wildlife, which is one of the biggest sources of its revenues.
Opposition to CWM also originates from two other levels: the Wildlife
Department and individual wildlife officers.%
Even governments, for instance, in Zambia and Zimbabwe that
have been reported as "officially" committed to CWM have, in fact, failed
to subscribe fully to this new approach.' For instance, after ten years of the
Administrative Management Design for Game Management Areas
(ADMADE) program, at no level of the Zambian government was there a
clear consensus of what the CWM approach was and there was no official
national policy that would enable amendments to relevant legislation tobe
made to support the approach." There was no emphasis by the state."
Generally, CWM requires conservationists and the responsible
government agencies to involve local communities and groups in those
communities in all wildlife-related decisions." ° But Pilegaard and Gibson
and Marks report that until 1995 communities participating in the
ADMADE program had no more rights and powers regarding wildlife

94. See Simon Coldham, Land Tenure Reform inTanzania:Legal Problemsand Perspectives,
33 J.MOD. AFR.STUD. 227,233 (1995).
95. Id. at 234.
96. See Songorwa, supra note 16, at 147.
97. See Sibanda, supra note 28, at 128; Siachoono, supra note 10, at 248; Metcalfe, supra
note 73, at 187; Western, supranote 9, at 40.
98. See IIED, supra note 2, at 84; Gibson & Marks, supra note 46, at 950-52.
99. See Letter from A. Pilegaard, Head of East and Southern Africa Division, European
Commission, Directorate-GeneralforDevelopment, to Ms. Hoffman, BMZ 2-3 (Jan. 27,1995) (on
file with the author) (transmitting comments on questions of the German Delegation
regarding financing proposal for the development of sustainable wildlife management
towards the diversification of the economy in Zambia).
100. See generallyM. Bathgate & A. Memon, Towards Co-Management of Fisheries in
New Zealand: Paper presented at Sea Views Conference on Marine Ecosystem Management
Obligations and Opportunities (Feb. 11-14, 1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author); Steve L. McMullin & Larry A. Nielsen, Resolution of Natural Resource Allocation

Conflicts through Effective Public Involvement, 19 POL'Y STUD. J.553, 553, 557-59 (1991).
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management than they had before its introduction.101 The program is
reported to have emphasized central administration, delegating "too little
to communities."102
The Luangwa Integrated Rural Development Project (LIRDP), also
in Zambia, failed to win the committed support of some government
agencies, including the Department of National Parks and Wildlife Service,
which perceived the project as interfering with its areas of responsibility."0 '
And the Zambia Wetlands Project (ZWP) was inadequately linked to local
government structures.104
The delayed take-off for the Communal Area Management
Program for Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE) in Zimbabwe is said to
have been caused by conflicts of interest and skepticism at the national
level about the development of wildlife as an alternative land-use to
agriculture and livestock.1"' There are reports also that the Department of
National Parks believed it was still in control and that it only lacked
financial support from Treasury. Metcalfe reports further that the
department feared that by accepting the program it was relinquishing its
authority to a rival Ministry."~
The relevant Zimbabwean government agencies are reluctant to
devolve authority to local communities.' CAMPFIRE is district-based and
district councils are state organs. Matzke and Nabane quote Murombedzi
as saying, for instance, that in Nyaminyami district "local participation in
[wildlife] management simply does not exist."'19 Also, the communities in
Masoka ward manage not wildlife but the 50 percent wildlife revenues
allocated to them.1 0 After all, the "Appropriate Authority" status granted
to participating district councils does not mean that the councils have total
authority over wildlife in their jurisdictions. Legal authority is retained by
the central government."1 Derman reports that the government is dragging
its feet because it does not want to jeopardize, "through political and social

101. See Letter from A. Pilegaard to Ms. Hoffman, supra note 99, at 2; Gibson & Marks,
supra note 46, at 951-52.
102. Letter from Dr. Ludwig Siege to Director of Wildlife et al., supra note 65, at 1.
103. See IIED, supranote 2, at 36.
104. See id. at 85-86.

105. See Barbier, supra note 17, at 111.
106.
107.
108.
109.

See Metcalfe, supra note 73, at 165-66.
See id. See also Derman, supra note 42, at 205,211-12.
See Murphree, supra note 30, at 415-16; Seymour, supra note 73, at 484.
Matzke & Nabane, supra note 8, at 74.

110.

See Physick, supra note 37, at 85; Hill, supra note 33, at 114; Metcalfe, supra note 73,

at 174-79.

111.

See Matzke & Nabane, supra note 8, at 66-68.
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experimentation," the tourism and safari hunting industries, which are big
sources of foreign exchange." 2
The CAMPFIRE program has been operating in an ambiguous
situation because of the existing conflict between Zimbabwe's laws and the
principles and policy of the program."3 Katerere et al. speculate that the
human population increase in the Zambezi valley (one of the program
areas) is a deliberate government strategy, through its resettlement
program, to dump people there in order to avoid public pressure to
expropriate white-owned commercial farms."' Also, during the struggle for
independence, the current government leaders, then as a nationalist
movement, urged rural people to resist the implementation of wildlife
conservation policies."'
After reviewing the progress and impacts of fifteen Community
Conservation Services and CWM programs and projects in Africa,
including the ones above, the International Institute for Environment and
Development (lIED) found that some national governments were unwilling
to support the approach because it was perceived to threaten central
authority. 11 Generally, it is reported that "governments [are] effectively
putting an 'upper limit' on the role of local community participation 1in17
many important planning, implementation, and management decisions."
All these cases suggest that devolution of genuine powers and community
participation in wildlife conservation as objectives are not achievable.
B. Rural Communities Are Willing to Participate in Wildlife Conservation
Poverty-the inability to attain a minimal standard of
living 8 -and its synonyms are the common terms associated with CWM
in Africa."' The majority of rural people in African countries are poor and
destitute. At the same time, the lands they occupy are endowed with many
112.
113.
114.

Derman, supra note 42, at 212.
See MURPHREE, supra note 20, at 2-4.
See Hill, supra note 33, at 112.

115. See id. at 108.
116. See lIED, supra note 2, at 15, 32-33, 57-58. See also WELLS ET AL., supra note 1, at 5253.
117. Barbier, supra note 17, at 107. See also Edmund Barrow et al., Community
ConservationLessonsfrom Benefit Sharingin EastAfrica, in INTEGRATING PEOPLE AND WILDLIFE
FOR A SUSTAINABLE FUTURE, supra note 14, at 21, 21-22; Western, supra note 9, at 47; and
Metcalfe, supra note 73, at 164, 166, 174-79, 183-84.
118. 118 See THE WORLD BANK, POVERTY: WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS 26 (World
Development Report, 1990).
119. See Child, supra note 59, at 58; Metcalfe, supra note 73, at 165; LIVING WITH
WILDLIFE, supra note 17, at 1, 6.
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unique and spectacular (at least to outsiders) wild animals, which are
currently being decimated by poachers. Proponents of CWM are convinced
that because of the people's need to free themselves from poverty,
destitution, and starvation and their need for development, as long as there
are donor funds and credible brokers1 they will accept the CWM approach
as put forward to them by those proponents.
The community interests referred to in this assumption are mainly
economic, that is revenue collection and creation of jobs for community
members.12 But complaints expressed by African farmers and other rural
residents there about the animals raise the question of whether they are, or
can be, interested in having the dangerous and destructive pest species
roaming around their homes and in their farms."
The main reason rural communities in Africa have negative
attitudes toward wildlife is because many species found there are
destructive and dangerous. iu For instance, in Tanzania, a group of Village
Scouts attending training revealed that crop damage by wildlife led to
serious shortages of food in their communities.lU As a result of the
increasing problem many farmers had to live permanently on their farms
to guard crops, thereby forcing children to walk long distances to and from
school, further risking attacks by dangerous animals." A staff member of
Selous Conservation Program (SCP) in Tanzania believed that because of
increasing crop damage it was going to take time for the program to
succeed.' 26
Also, wildlife kills and injures many rural residents. For instance,
Songorwa reports 48 deaths and 36 injuries caused by lions in Tunduru
district in Tanzania alone between 1985 and 1988-an average of one death

120. See LIVING wrrH WILDLIFE, supra note 17, at iv, 29.
121. See Murphree, supranote 46, at 158,162-64,171,175; Derman, supra note 42, at 20102; Metcalfe, supra note 73, at 182-83; LIVING WITH WILDLIFE, supra note 17, at 36-40;
Cleophas Lado, Problems of Wildlife Management and Land Use in Kenya, LAND USE POL'Y,
July 1992, at 169, 179-80, 183-4 (1992).
122. See, e.g., Songorwa, supra note 16, at 50; M.N. Tchamba, Historyand Present Status
of the Human/Elephant Conflict in the Waza-Logone Region, Cameroon, West Africa, 75
BIOLOGICAL CONSERVATION 35, 37-38 (1996); John S. Akama et al., Conflicting Attitudes
toward State Wildlife Conservation Programs in Kenya, 8 SOC'Y & NAT. RESOURcEs 133, 135,
137-42 (1995); Barrow et aL, supra note 14, at 255; Raybourn, supra note 44, at 44; C.R.
Thouless & J.Sakwa, Shocking Elephants:Fences and Crop Raiders in Laikipia District,Kenya,
72 BIOLOGICAL CONSERVATION 99, 99 (1995); David Parry & Bruce Campbell, Attitudes of
Rural Communities to Animal Wildlife and Its Utilization in Chobe Enclave and Mababe
Depression,Botswana, 19 ENVTL. CONSERVATION 245, 247 (1992).
123. See Songorwa, supra note 16, at 50.
124. See id. at 282.
125. See id. at 283.
126. See id. at 282.
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a month and three injuries every four months'v Also, he reveals that 29
others were killed and 17 injured, again by lions, in Liwale district between
July 1994 and September 1995.12
In Botswana, Parry and Campbell found that people experiencing
crop and livestock losses to wildlife were, on average, more negative
towards it than those who did not experience such losses. The two report
that "[t]he most commonly-voiced solution.. .was that the National Park
should be moved further away from the people."" In Cameroon, 36
percent of residents in the Waza-Logone region wanted elephants there to
be moved and fenced somewhere far from their area.' " In LIRDP program
areas in Zambia, farmers also wanted the South Luangwa National Park to
be fenced and crop-damaging animals to be shot.131 Likewise in Swaziland
where Hackel found that although 90 percent of his respondents favored
nature conservation in general, few would like conservation areas to be
established near their communities." Therefore, if it is true that wild
"animals are wildlife as long as they pose no direct threat to humans,"
the question becomes whether these destructive and dangerous species are
essential to the livelihoods of rural people."u
Since most CWM programs are initiated as a reaction to declining
wildlife populations, in most the wildlife populations are small at first.
Consequently people-wildlife conflicts are minimal, and the people suffer
relatively fewer losses. But the main objective of CWM, especially in buffer
zone programs, is to preserve the integrity of the respective protected area
and its wildlife and not to replace existing economic activities with wildlife
utilization. That means the communities recruited in those programs

See id. at 345-47, app.1.
See id.
Parry & Campbell, supra note 122, at 249.
See Tchamba, supra note 122, at 39.
See Mundanthra Balakrishnan & Dora E. Ndhlovu, Wildlife Utilization and Local
A Case-Study in Upper Lupande Game Management Area, Zambia, 19 ENVTL.
CONSERVATION 135, 138, 141-42 (1992).
132. See Jeffrey D. Hackel,ConservationAttitudesin SouthernAfrica: A Comparison between
KwaZulu and Swaziland, 18 HUM. ECOLOGY 203,205 (1990).
Rural people's negative attitudes toward dangerous and destructive species of
wildlife are "a wildlife issue" in other parts of the world as well. See, e.g., Guha, supra note
47, at 16-17 (for reactions from Chenchu hunter-gatherers to the creation of a tiger reserve
in the state of Andhra Pradesh, India); MICHAEL P. MOULTON &JAMES SANDERSON, WILDLIFE
ISSUES INA CHANGING WORLD 271-74 (1997) (for opposition to the reintroduction of the
secretive panther in northern Florida, United States of America).
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
People:

133.

MOULTON & SANDERSON, supra note 132, at 1.

134. But the communities' suffering does not mean that they are totally opposed to
wildlife conservation. Where/if it is contained to a level in which it causes less or no harm,
they may be interested in conserving it. See also JAMES M. PEEK, A REVIEW OF WILDLIFE
MANAGEMENT 33-35 (1986).
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continue to depend on agriculture and livestock as their main sources of
income. Non-buffer zone programs, on the other hand, intend, at least in
theory, to make wildlife management a competitive economic land-use on
communal lands. But, due to the uncertainties associated with wildlife
(unknown sustained yield levels, stability of populations, harvesting
patterns of other users [legal and illegal], outbreak of epidemics, and
environmental factors such as drought), the uncertainties in the tourism
and sport-hunting industries and instability of governments and their
policies, the fact that only a few species are marketable, human population
increase in program areas, increasing human needs and wants, and other
constraints, it is highly unlikely that wildlife conservation can become the
dominant land-use.
Where and if wildlife and human populations grow, conflicts
increase. Community members lose more and more crops and livestock,
and an increasing number of them get killed or injured. Also, indirect
impacts such as disruption of social activities whereby community
members have to spend almost every day and night guarding their crops
and children miss school to help their parents"s will increase. But even
where wildlife-people conflicts may be on the rise, conservationists and the
governments are usually reluctant to help and may actually prevent the
communities "from eliminating 'problem' animals." 1 ' The most likely
outcome is that instead of having their well-being improved as promised
by the CWM approach, these communities, whose members are already
poor, will sink deeper into poverty.
Participation is a principle borrowed by the CWM approach from
the concepts of sustainable development and integrated rural development.
It means "the active involvement of people in the making and implementation of decisions at all levels and forms of political and socio-economic
activities." 7 In CWM, participation relates to the voluntary active
involvement of rural communities in making choices of planning,
implementing, and evaluating programs and projects. It requires active
involvement of all, or at least the majort of, community members and all
community groups, including women. However, community participation in wildlife management may be hampered by the tendency for people

135. See Tchamba, supra note 122, at 38.
136. LIVING WITH WILDLIFE, supra note 17, at 5.

137. Franklyn Lisk, The Role of Popular Participationin Basic Needs-OrientedDevelopment
Planning,in POPULAR PARTICIPATION IN PLANNING FOR BASIC NEEDS: CONCEPTS, METHODS

AND PRACTICES 15,15 (Franklyn Lisk ed., 1985).

138. See Hazel R.Barrett& Angela W. Browne, Women's Time, Labour-SavingDevices and
Rural Development in Africa, 29 COMMUNY DEv.J. 203,203-05,212-13 (1994); LIEBENBERG
&GROSSMAN, supra note 5, at 8.

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 40

in a (large) group setting not to cooperate, or to "free-ride." 13 For instance,

in his monthly report for July 1995 one SCP staff member complained
about villagers' low attendance at program-related meetings. In the
previous month he had reported that out of 15 villages he visited to attend
annual budget meetings, in only three villages did any people turn up.'
Failure to ensure fellow community members' cooperation could make
those few villagers indifferent and even hostile to conservation efforts.' 4'
Another factor is the reluctance by many people to use personal or
individual resources to produce public goods."
Toulmin et al. state that "[tihe returns from wildlife use can be
potentially higher than alternative options of dry land agriculture ....
But, as they, Child, Raybourn, Little, Murphree and Kiss, explain, this is
only possible in very poor or marginal areas where soils are poor, the
climate is arid, and crop surpluses are rare.'" Those areas must also have
big tracts of uninhabited and uncultivated lands, big wildlife populations,
and only a small human population.'" Only in such areas is the value of
wildlife expected to be higher than other land uses. As well as being small,
the human population must be economically less stratified, with strong
intra-and inter-community linkages and less conflict. There must also be
easy access to the market for wildlife products and services. Since all these
conditions must occur together, it is difficult to find a community that
combines all these characteristics. Strong linkages within and between
communities may, in fact, make anti-poaching operations by the communities difficult as community members are less likely to reveal their family
neighbors', and friends' illegal activities from which
members', relatives',
1
they benefit. "
Another condition for success for CWM is that revenues accruing
from wildlife (whatever the type and amount) must remain in the hands of
the community, to be reinvested in wildlife management and to be spent

139. Douglas D. Heckathorn, The Dynamics and DilemmasofCollectiveAction,61 AM. SOC.
REv. 250, 251 (1996); OSTROM, supra note 75, at 6, 32, 241 n.25.
140. See Songorwa, supra note 16, at 181.
141. See Barbier, supra note 17, at 131.
142. See Clifford S. Russell, Applications of Public Choice Theory: An Introduction, in
COLLECIVE DECISION MAKING: APPLICATIONS FROM PUBUCCHOICETHEORY 1,3,13 (Clifford

S. Russell ed., 1979).
143. Camilla Toulmin et al., The FutureofAfrica's Drylands,in THE EARTHSCAN READER
IN SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 254,254 (John Kirkby et al. eds., 1995).

144. See id.; Child, supra note 59, at 58; Raybourn, supra note 44, at 4445; Little, supra
note 64, at 360; MURPHREE, supra note 20, at 5-7; LVING WITH WILDLIFE, supra note 17, at 1,
157-58.
145. See Murphree, supra notes 46, at 175; MURPHREE, supra note 81, at 7-8; Metcalfe,
supra note 73, at 163, 169-71.
146. See Songorwa, supra note 16, at 183; Gibson & Marks, supra note 46, at 948.
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on community development projects. The revenues must reach the majority
of community members in an open, easily understood, and straightforward
manner. 4 ' Together with financing community projects, it is crucial that
program benefits reach individual households and their members because
the costs of wildlife conservation extend "to personal jeopardy."' But, the
increase of human populations in program areas means smaller dividends
to households and, thus, lower incentive for them, and their members, to
participate in the programs. For instance, the fast growing human
population in Zimbabwe (increasing at35 percent per annum), particularly
in some CAMPFIRE program areas, and the government's resettlement
schemes threaten the program.149 Also, immigration is likely to increase

heterogeneity and conflicts in the relevant communities.'rs
Instead of devolving authority and responsibility to communities,
some CWM programs create new layers of bureaucracy that are too big for
the communities to manage and do not serve the interests of member
communities."'1 For instance, the SCP in Tanzania advised 19 communities
to form a cooperative society (an NGO) and called it Jumuiya ya Kuhifadhi
MaliasiliUkutu (JUKUMU) in Kiswahili.'5 2 The formation of JUKUMU was
going to force the 19 communities to cooperate in a larger project with a
cadre of managers."s But experience shows that small community
organizations are more appropriate for social organization, institutional
management, and continued commitment."' Also, community participation creates intra- and/or inter-community conflicts"" and may increase
those that already exist."s Although some people believe that communitybased programs limit conflicts,"5' many CWM programs have experienced
serious problems as a result of these "intracommunity tensions, political
dynamics, needs and aspirations.""

supra note 117, at 23.
147. See Barrow et al.,
148. Murphree, supra note 46, at 168.
149. See Hill, supra note 33, at 112-13.
150. See Little, supra note 64, at 357-58; Strum, supra note 50, at 514; Murphree, supra
note 30, at 418-20.
151. See Gibson & Marks, supra note 46, at 942.
152. See Songorwa, supra note 16, at 141.
153. See id. at 204.
154. See Derman, supra note 42, at 209-11.
155. SeeJulesPretty et al.,RegeneratingAgriculture:TheAgroecologyofLow-External Input
and Community-Based Development, in THE EARTHSCAN READER IN SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT, supra note 143, at 125, 137; LIvNG WITH WILDLIFE,supra note 17, at 32.
156. See FRIEDMANN, supra note 28, at 147-49 n.7; Strum, supra note 50, at 514-15.
157. See Sibanda, supra note 28, at 121-22; Strum, supra note 50, at 514-16.
158. LIEBENBERG & GROSSMAN, supra note 5, at 6.
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Lastly, many times it has been stated that at the community level
in poor countries people's basic needs are immediate.1 " Because they are
caught in a poverty trap, survival is their main concem." In fact, some
consider improvement of their livelihoods and development unattainable
and regard "the debate on endangered species as a luxury they cannot
afford."16 It is, therefore, unlikely for a community with all or the majority
of its households existing in such a volatile situation to have long-term
plans and a clear vision of the future. Where a community happens to have
a vision it is in terms of access to basic needs and not in terms of wildlife
conservation. If they know what they need and have a vision regarding
wildlife, it is to one day have all crop raiding and dangerous species
eliminated or relocated to places far from their settlements and farms. This
is one of their basic needs, which then raises the question of whether they
have any "positive" vision regarding wildlife conservation.
C. Communities Have the Required Wildlife Knowledge and Capability to Manage Wildlife
Proponents of CWM claim to have discovered that local communities in wildlife areas have the knowledge required for wildlife management. What is referred to here is "traditional" knowledge, knowledge
that has been acquired through long-term observation of ecosystems in
which the communities live,"' and that has been handed down over
generations, as opposed to "local" knowledge, which may have been
acquired recently even by immigrants and government employees.'"
Therefore, wildlife knowledge is here perceived to be an inherent part of
a culture or lifestyle.
Some proponents of CWM have argued that both traditional and
scientific knowledge involve the same scientific reasoning," and that
conservationists, states, and their agencies charged with wildlife management should respect, learn, and utilize both forms of knowledge to achieve

159. See Jeffrey Alwang et al., Seeking Guidelinesfor Poverty Reduction in Rural Zambia,
24 WORLD DEv. 1711,1712-13 (1996); Christopher E. Morrow &Rebecca Watts Hull, DonorInitiated Common Pool Resource Institutions: The Case of the Yanesha Forestry Cooperative, 24
WORLD DEv. 1641, 1642 (1996); Hutton et al., supra note 48, at 271.
160. See Murphree, supra note 46, at 159-60; FRIEDMANN, supra note 28, at 55-66.
161. Sibanda, supra note 28, at 120.
162. See Gibson & Marks, supra note 46, at 944.
163. See Hyndman, supra note 21, at 297-98; Raval, supra note 9, at 316; LIVING WITH
WILDUFE, supra note 17, at 25-26.
164. See R. Rivera & G.F. Newkirk, Power from the People: A Documentation of NonGovernmental Organizations'Experience in Community-Based CoastalResource Management in
the Philippines,36 OCEAN & COASTAL MGMT. 73,89 (1997); MORS, supra note 27, at 8-12.
165. See LIEBENBERG & GROSSMAN, supra note 5, at 9.
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conservation goals.1" But until recently there was a general consensus
among those same conservationists that local communities lacked the
knowledge, the
will, and the training to undertake sustainable wildlife
16
management, 7
For the communities to use wildlife sustainably, they must possess
or be able to access all relevant information. For instance, in order to
address appropriation problems associated with allocating hunting quotas,
Schlager et al. advise that
resource users must possess information on the size of the
population, the population dynamics..., the number of units
being harvested, and the effect of each resource user's harvest
upon every other resource user's harvests; and from this
information determine the optimal harvest level. In a CPR
[Common-Pool Resource] with mobile flows, flows which
often fluctuate unpredictably, such information may be very
difficult...to obtain. It is difficult for resource users to accurately assess the extent of variations in flow, to determine
whether an observed flow decline is merely temporary or
part of a longer-term phenomenon, and to diagnose the cause
of the decline."
But the communities lack this important scientific and ecological
information that could enable them to make informed decisions, especially
in setting hunting quotas, because it is not available or because of
difficulties in accessing it. 6 For instance, Songorwa quotes a senior staff
member of SCP as saying, "Until today we do not know the villagers'
consumption [levels). We have not even carried out a census to know the
animals in all these areas, in order to develop a sustainable hunting quota.
There are not even good methods of developing the hunting quota."17'
While they are said to have wildlife knowledge, communities
recruited into CWM programs "are being trained in [wildlife] management
techniques."171 This implies that community members have to be trained by
conservationists to be able to undertake wildlife management. But if, as
proponents of CWM claim, wildlife knowledge exists in the communities,

166. See Brosius et al., supra note 43, at 158-59; Durbin &Ralambo, supra note 54, at 116,
118; Raval, supra note 9, at 316.
167.
168.

See HIED, supra note 2, at 11-13, 55; Berkes & Farvar, supra note 78, at 3-5.
Edella Schlager et al., Mobile Flows, Storage and Self-Organized Institutionsfor

Governing Common-Pool Resources, 70 LAND ECON. 294,297 (1994).
169.
170.

See Siachoono, supra note 10, at 248; IIED, supra note 2, at 29-32.
Songorwa, supra note 16, at 301.

171.

FITTER, supra note 26, at 173.
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and if they respect, value, and honor it, there is no need to train community
members in something they already know.
Some proponents of CWM urge program implementers "to rely to
the extent possible on existing traditional institutions."" But for over a
century the communities were ordered by conservationists, through the
respective governments, to keep their hands off wildlife. For over a century
their knowledge, if they had any, was not properly regarded, if regarded
at all.173 As if that were not enough, during that period many communities
were forcibly relocated to give way to wildlife-"the common heritage of
mankind" (sic) as Timberlake calls it. 7 Also, they were intimidated,
harassed, beaten, jailed, and even shot and killed in the name of wildlife
protection. As a result of forced relocations people became detached from
their ancestral lands and their land-based cultures and eventually lost their
traditional institutions and whatever wildlife knowledge they had
accumulated.
Traditional knowledge is not taught in classrooms, neither is it
written or preserved on video or audio tapes or CD-roms. In a traditional
system of learning there are no libraries or archives from which the
knowledge can easily be retrieved. In this way of life any acquired
knowledge is passed from one generation to another through tales,
observation, and mainly through practice-behaviors, actions, dances,
songs, and rituals. Because it is not written and because for many
generations since the first colonial governments the people were brainwashed and forced to believe that their systems of governance, cultures,
and knowledge were primitive, worthless and something to be ashamed
of, and as they were forced out of their "traditional business," there has
been a big loss of whatever knowledge they had accumulated-gone with
the generations that have passed." In Tanzania, for instance, traditional
leadership was banned at independence and, with the exception of a few
pockets, has almost disappeared."7
In any learning system, childhood is the crucial learning period."'
In the traditional system children learned by doing through interaction
with their older brothers and sisters, playmates, parents, other family
members, and neighbors. They learned when tending the family cattle
herds, when helping parents to cut building poles or ropes, when collecting

172.
173.

LIVING WITH WILDLIFE, supra note 17, at 25.
See LIEBENBERG &GROSSMAN, supra note 5, at 9-10; Balakrishnan & Ndhlovu, supra

note 131, at 135; Berkes & Farvar, supra note 78, at 3.
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175. See Songorwa, supra note 16, at 58-59.
176. See id. at 59.
177.
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firewood in the bush, and when hunting. But with the introduction of
formal education, and by making primary education compulsory, the
period for children to learn traditional knowledge has been shortened"
and, in many cases, eliminated altogether. A child would begin to
accompany adults, or older siblings, to the bush at around age five. But
now, from that age he/she has to be enrolled in school. After completing
primary education, nowadays many of those who do not proceed to
secondary school, especially boys, migrate to urban areas to set up petty
businesses or search for jobs. They do not get enough time to learn the
traditional knowledge, and when they are adults they do not have much
traditional knowledge to pass on to the younger generations. Furthermore,
the younger generations tend to regard any traditional knowledge as
outdated.
Knowledge is not something static. Rather, it evolves through time
as people become exposed to new and more challenging problems and
learn new and better ways of resolving those problems.' The people's
long alienation from their ancestral lands and from the wildlife, and their
change of role from lawful users to criminals (poachers) for over a century
means they have been disconnected from (or have lacked exposure to) the
continually evolving wildlife management problems. Most of the wildlife
knowledge their ancestors had has been lost already. Songorwa reports
that some community members participating in SCP admitted that without
this program they, and their children, would not even have known some
wildlife species.1" Unlike the situation prior to Operation Uhai and the
program, now the animals came close to their farms and settlements. 1 8 As
a result they became tourists in their own homelands because they were in
the process of (re)learning about those animals.
Where traditional wildlife knowledge exits, it is outdated and of
less use in current situations. If the communities have to manage wildlife
they require intensive training and access to reliable ecological information.
But training community members alone may not bring much benefit to

178. See Britta Antonsson-Ogle, Wild Plant Resources: Another Form of Food Security, 17
CERES 38,40 (1984).
179.

See THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 66-76 (3d ed.

1996).
180. See Songorwa, supra note 16, at 226.
181. In Tanzania, the poaching problem became so serious that in June 1989 the
government launched a nation-wide special anti-poaching operation and nicknamed it
Operation Uhai ("Uhai" is a Kiswahili word for life). Seeid. at98.OperationUhai continued
until March 1991 and succeeded in halting the wave of poaching, at least for a while. See
id. at 99. Therefore, the increase of wildlife, or its return to settled areas, may not have been
a result of the CWM component of SCP. It may have been a result of Operation Uhai,
improved anti-poaching operation by Game Scouts in Selous Game Reserve, and/or the
ban by CITES on international trade in ivory. See id. at 220.
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CWM programs in terms of addressing internal (social and institutional)
and external (economic, political and social) problems related to wildlife
management. There is, therefore, no guarantee that training will enable the
communities to manage wildlife sustainably in the current, increasingly
complex and uncertain situation.
CWM programs have explicitly stated that they aspire to change
rural people's behaviors and reduce poaching in the areas where it
occurred."s To control poaching, a community and its government (formal
or traditional) have to introduce rules of behavior that both residents and
non-residents respect. These rules must be internalized within existing
frameworks and attitudes. This has so far proven to be a difficult task. For
instance, in ADMADE,I CAMPFIRE, ' and some SCP areas poachers
reacted by changing their hunting techniques from shooting to snaring.Is
In many CWM programs there have been reports of the continuation, reappearance, and even increase of this illegal activity.m
The literature refers to traditional wildlife harvesting regimes,
which existed in hunter-gatherer societies. 1s7 These traditional societies
changed harvesting techniques depending on seasons and availability of
the huntable species. But the regimes did not involve active wildlife
management as such. Nevertheless, traditional systems of wildlife
harvesting in Africa have declined significantly." Wildlife harvesting by
these communities in the past is seen to have been sustainable only because
human populations were small, scattered, and with temporary or semipermanent settlements. Also, their harvesting technologies were
inefficient. 18 That means there was more supply of wildlife than the
demand and, therefore, there was always a surplus.
As stated earlier, the literature refers also to "discovered" CPR
regimes. However, in each of these cases a regime evolved where the
people were directly dependent on the resource(s) for their survival.' This

182. See, e.g., Songorwa, supra note 16, at 99, 120-22 (for SCP); Gibson & Marks, supra
note 46, at 945-51 (for ADMADE); Siachoono, supra note 10, at 249 (for ADMADE).
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184. See Metcalfe, supra note 73, at 186.
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186. See id. at 218-20; Kelso, supra note 33, at 52-53.
187. See Berkes & Farvar, supra note 78, at 8-9; lIED, supra note 2, at 12, 14-15.
188. See Christopher J.N. Gibbs & Daniel W. Bromley, Institutional Arrangementsfor
Managementof RuralResources: Common-PropertyRegimes, in COMMONPROPERTYRESOURCES:
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189. See Physick, supranote 37, at 85; Lado, supranote 121, at 173; MORs, supra note 27,
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leads us to three important questions: Does the survival of rural communities in Africa depend on the crop-raiding elephants and killer lions? Is such
wildlife a resource to those communities? Can a "traditional" regime
evolve to conserve such animals?
A further explanation for the inability of the communities to
manage wildlife is that the current wildlife conservation problems such as
poaching and habitat destruction have most of their sources outside the
communities and, therefore, there is little those communities can do to
control them."91
The process of institutional development at the community level
is arduous and slow, often longer than the period required or estimated for
the implementation of a community-based program."2 It is unlikely,
therefore, for a community participating in CWM to become self-sustaining, institutionally or financially, by the end of external funding and
supervision. It has been observed in many agricultural projects that
technologies are adopted only under close supervision of external officials,
the departure of whom often signifies the end of effective use of that
technology." CWM programs bear similarities with these projects because
it is these same rural communities, households, and individuals who are
expected to implement them. Therefore, as both Barnes and the IED
conclude, there is no guarantee of significant impact by participatory
approaches."'
Like all communities, rural communities, however small they may
be, are faced with internal conflicts. Conflicts also exist between neighboring communities. For instance, Songorwa reports conflicts between village
wildlife management committees and the respective village governments
in almost all communities participating in the SCP, and also between
neighboring communities (between participating communities themselves
and between those participating and those not participating)." As the size

ManagementPracticesin the Maluku Islands,Indonesia, 1870-1992, in NATURALCONNECFIONS:
PERSPECTIVES INCOMMUNITY-BASEDCONSERVATIONsupra note 3, at 80; OSTROM, supra note
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193.
194.

See Pretty et al., supra note 155, at 130, 138.
See Barnes, supra note 51, at 800-01; IED, supra note 2, at 58-59.

195.

See Songorwa, supranote 16, at 195-96.

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 40

of a community increases, heterogeneity increases and so too do the intraand inter-community conflicts.'9 Common property regimes are not
expected to emerge easily in heterogeneous communities."
The notion that in rural communities people still do things
communally and, therefore, the participatory approach is likely to succeed
may also be ill-conceived because socio-economic changes now occurring
around the continent favor individualization. In many rural communities
people are slowly losing the sense of community. Moorehead states, for
instance, that "[o]n a more general level the customary social and economic
ties that bound communities together are becoming weaker. "1" The stress
on creating community-level institutions to manage wildlife runs counter
to these individualizing forces.
Lastly, there is now a widespread understanding that, in their role
as managers of natural resources, women are the backbone of development
activities. 1" In the course of their activities they come in regular contact
with wildlife and, in fact, those activities are affected by wildlife.' Women
have a key influence on the quality of the environment.' Also, they have
a wealth of local (not traditional) knowledge to build on concerning local
environments and the constraints and opportunities they present. But rural
development programs, from which CWM has borrowed its principles, are
said to have never been gender neutral, due to the fact that women have
had less access to social (education, health, decision-making) and economic
(income) power bases and information.' Songorwa reports to have found
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little participation by women in the SCP.' In their study of Masoka
community in the CAMPFIRE program, Nabane and Matzke also found
that only three percent of the community-members who reported
engagement in CAMPFIRE-related employment were women' Also, the
two found no women on the CAMPFIRE wildlife committee. Such gender
insensitivity is believed to contribute to failures of many rural programs
and projects.'
D. Wildlife Conservation and Community Development Are Compatible
The CWM approach intends to reconcile wildlife conservation and
rural development.' Two main outcomes are expected from the reconciliation: conservationists expect to achieve conservation goals, and the rural
communities expect to realize development.' The sort of development that
proponents of CWM have in mind for the communities is often referred to
as sustainable community development, which has been defined as "a
community-based approach to development which relies on self-help,
community economic development and ecological principles."' However,
CWM focuses on the socio-economic well-being of the communities and
households and individuals in those communities, especially on increasing
their incomes. For instance, referring to the CAMPFIRE program, Kiss
argues, "[w]ildlife has proved to be a powerful agent for economic
development," and CWM can help build rural economies. Having roots
in the Basic Needs approach to development, CWM seeks to maximize use
and control of local resources by the communities. 10
It is argued that programs implemented in rural areas in poor
countries must be integrated and must be able to deliver both short-term
and long-term benefits to communities. 211 Expected short-term benefits
from CWM programs are mostly socio-economic and tangible, for instance,
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health clinics, hospital drugs, school buildings, roads, cash dividends, and
even food."' CWM programs have to deliver these short-term, tangible
benefits, because at the household level they act as incentives for people to
participate fully in the programs.1 The households and their members
have to be given these incentives so that they can stop destroying wildlife
and its habitats. "Putting the farmers first is, in brief, the formula for
successfully linking wildlife conservation and sustainable rural development in Africa," declares Murphree.21'
Goals and planning for CWM, especially in non-buffer zone
programs, have been largely oriented toward business interests and
community economic growth. 1 But if CWM is measured foremost in terms
of cash flows to communities, households and individuals,216 the approach
introduces the communities to market-led development, a form of
development over which they will have no control. This type of development is controlled by increasingly globalized supply and demand, prices
of goods and services, and big economic players.
Proponents of non-buffer zone CWM want economic development
for the communities to come first.2 17 But this has not happened. For
instance, Metcalfe reveals that Nyaminyami district in Zimbabwe "spent
too high a percentage of its revenue on management, resulting in a smaller
community benefit." 218 Also, the question remains whether improving rural
people's incomes does lead to an improvement in attitudes to wildlife, and
whether CWM programs can generate enough income to replace the
ecologically "damaging," but economically rewarding, activities such as
poaching.
Also, the "marriage" between wildlife conservation and rural
socio-economic development can be hampered by differences in perceptions of CWM goals between proponents of the approach and community
members. Generally, the former perceive CWM programs as mainly
conservation programs while the latter (and politicians) may perceive them
as development-oriented, and be interested more, or even only, in
212.
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generating economic and social benefits rather than conserving or
protecting the wildlife. 19 Songorwa reveals that many Village Scouts and
committee members (and many ordinary villagers) in the SCP did not
understand what the program was all about'2 Program staff members also
believed the villagers understood the program to be about their development: "They think that this is a source of income;" "At this stage many of
them know that this program is for them to get meat, that is all;" and
"Many think it is a cropping program. I mean they don't know the
objectives of the program."'" The stronger the difference in goals between
the two sides, the fiercer the conflicts between them and the weaker the
community members' interest and participation in activities geared toward
wildlife conservation.
Conservationists and state wildlife authorities would like to bring
as much land area as possible under protected area management because,
from an ecological perspective, the more and bigger the protected areas, the
better.' This is enough reason for suspicion on the part of rural communities for they do not want to see protected areas established that restrict their
use of the land.' For instance, Songorwa found that the SCP alienated
further the participating communities from land and wildlife.' Before the
program, villagers opened farms wherever they wished. That means they
had easy or even unlimited access to land in their areas. But after the
village lands were zoned through the program, the villagers could only
cultivate in the areas set aside for agriculture. It is unquestionable,
therefore, that the program reduced their access to land. Figures for SCP
show that 64 percent and 35 percent of village lands in two of the areas it
operates have been zoned for wildlife management.' These lands are now
out of reach of the farmers, whose numbers are increasing. However, this
plan is opposed by many communities. In his progress report for village
land-use survey work in October 1995, a surveyor in one of the program
areas stated that the villagers frustrated the exercise fearing loss of their
agricultural lands. From his study in Mumbwa Game Management
219. See Western, supra note 9, at 31-36; WELLS ET AL., supra note 1, at 1-2, 42-47. The
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Area-one of ADMADE Program Areas-Siachoono also reveals,
regarding local communities, that "[ilf left to themselves they probably
would use the GMA land for subsistence agriculture and. livestock
grazing."'2
Because they are often established as a reaction to declining
wildlife populations, ' CWM programs are expected and required to show
immediate positive ecological impacts. But, as we said earlier, changing
people's attitudes takes time, which, in this case, "may be the scarcest
commodity of all." ' If it takes two or more decades to change local
people's attitudes and behavior, there is no guarantee that by the time their
behavior has substantially changed there will still be wildlife to be
managed. There is also a possibility that people's behavior will not change
or that the change will be only temporary, in which case wildlife will not
be managed sustainably.
How to achieve both wildlife conservation and community
economic development at the same time is a big challenge left to those
implementing CWM programs.' The communities' desire for rapid
economic and social progress, combined with the use of wildlife for
commercial purposes, may lead them to over-exploit the wildlife.' Even
where the communities are small and fenced (like the situation in some
CAMPFIRE program areas), improved standards of living mean higher
demands for goods and services supplied by local natural resources." A
static or even declining population can still cause environmental degradation if the level of consumption of environmental goods and services
increases. 2 Also, The Ecologist cautions that "[ojnce...direct interest [in
protecting the surrounding environment] is removed-once members of
the community look outside the commons for their sustenance and social
standing-the cultural checks and balances that limit potential abuses of
the environment are rendered increasingly ineffective."' 3
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Perhaps with careful planning market-led economic development
could protect wildlife. But it is economic development that wiped out much
of the wildlife in Europe and North America, and many other places on this
planet.' Therefore, the conservation of wildlife requires not only limiting
the growth of local communities, but also limiting their consumption
levels. Implicitly, this means putting limits on community development,
in a "material" sense.
Barrett and Arcese give some reasons why CWM programs cannot
become economically sustainable.' Their reasons are that provision of
game meat and cash to the communities will not make them stop their
traditional hunting practices, that the programs are likely to increase local
demand for game meat, and that there are shortcomings regarding
revenue-sharing arrangements. Other reasons are that increased competition in marketing wildlife and its products is likely to bring down prices,
that tourism is unlikely to deliver net benefits for the local communities,
that few wildlife/protected areas in Africa attract a number of tourists big
enough to cover costs, and that the CWM programs threaten household
food security in the communities. They explain that CWM programs create
only a handful of jobs, which are likely to end once donor support is
withdrawn, and argue that the development component of these programs
is tedious and likely to fail, and that the host governments are unlikely to
support the programs, especially financially, when donor funding dries
out. This account of lurking problems sparked the strong attack from the
proponents' camp (see section one), but, so far, proponents have failed to
explain how CWM programs will avoid or mitigate these problems.
The CWM approach stresses the need for communities to receive
an equitable share of revenues or benefits generated from wildlife to
compensate them for the costs of living with wildlife. But the SCP denies
many community members "free" and unlimited access to game meat.'
Also, because of increasing crop damage, it is going to take time for the
program to succeed. Songorwa quotes one program staff member as
saying, "If one loses two acres and you go and tell him [or her] to conserve
the same animals he [or she] will not understand you and especially when
the only benefit he [or she] receives is one kilogram of meat."' In the
Zambian and Zimbabwean programs and projects the story is the same: the
intended communities did not receive the revenues initially promised, or
did not receive any at all. For instance, the Development Dialogue of
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Oct./Nov.1993 criticized ADMADE for "having an adverse effect on the
livelihood of villagers, by denying them access to game meat, their major
source of protein, and imposing levies that they cannot afford."' The
program had not been able to distribute revenues effectively.2' ° Even
village scouts had to work for up to six months without pay.24
In the manner of ADMADE, neither did the LIRDP's benefits
always reach the "target" communities.' Also, the communities were
dissatisfied with the prices of game meat from the program's culling
scheme.' ZWP is also said to have failed to address the real community
needs and existing resource problems.'
Regarding CAMPFIRE, Derman quotes Murombedzi reporting that
the main beneficiaries of wildlife, especially in Omay Communal Land,
continued to be safari companies and operators.' This should not come as
a surprise because other studies have also shown that a considerable
amount of tourism revenue returns directly to the tourist-generating
countries through payment of loans and dividends of foreign investment,
the importation of goods and services related to the business, and the
salaries of senior personnel who are often expatriates.'"
The CWM programs, and the communities in particular, cannot
control the growth of human populations. As a result, new farmers open
farms in areas occupied by wildlife.2 " For instance, reported economic
success in some areas of the CAMPFIRE program such as Masoka/
Kanyurira ward has put the program in danger ecologically, as many
people who had emigrated earlier returned, raising the total number of
households to 123 in 1995 from only 60 in 1988.1
Lastly, the description of CWM given above gives the impression
that its focus is more on human concerns than wildlife conservation. This
has recently been the concern of some "biologist-conservationists." 9 But
real success for CWM "is measured in terms of ecological objectives, such
as reduced poaching or increased [wildlife] populations."' This is problematic because, as discussed above, the increase of wildlife populations,
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especially where there are no effective barriers, often leads to increased
crop-raiding, predation, and loss of lives, which may further increase the
problems of securing a sustainable livelihood for the communities.
IV.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

The aim of CWM-to address the failures of the fences-and-fines
approach-is laudable. But is this new approach feasible and more effective
than the fences-and-fines approach? Two main factors make CWM unimplementable in Africa. First and foremost, the approach is a result of an
external demand. Experience has often shown that when demands at the
international level are passed on to national and local levels to solve
problems they become non-operational 5 1
Second, the main assumptions underlying it-governments are
willing to devolve ownership and management responsibilities for wildlife
to local communities, rural communities are willing to participate in
wildlife management, communities have the capability to manage the
wildlife in a sustainable way, and wildlife conservation and community
economic development are compatible-are problematic.
A CWM program can be successful "under the right conditions,"
which, unfortunately, "may not be found everywhere." 2 Although some
success has been reported from some programs and projects, all have faced
many problems as a result of the problematic nature of the assumptions
underlying the approach. The problems include lack of motivated staff,
conflicts between local and expatriate program staff, unsatisfactory links
to government structures and government support, failure to adopt the
intended participatory approach, and inability to meet the basic needs of
the communities and raise interest among community members-all of
which may be associated with a lack of comprehension of intra-community
tensions, needs, and aspirations. As with the fences-and-fines approach,
there is failure to stop or at least reduce poaching; and failure to reconcile
wildlife conservation and rural development. The problematic nature of the
assumptions relates to the discrepancy between what can be seen as
political, economic, socio-cultural, geophysical, and ecological conditions
that are required "to make CWM work" and the actual conditions.
Experience shows that it is difficult, first, to get the governments
to genuinely accept and adopt the participatory approach and to change
their exclusionary policies and legislation and move ownership (or even
user) rights and control over lands and wildlife to the communities. It is
also difficult to secure support and commitment from all state organs and
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at all levels, and to adopt an integrated approach between agencies and
between different levels of the same agency. Individual government actors
(the wildlife managers / officers) often hold different views than those held
by proponents of CWM. Few believe that the fences-and-fines approach
has failed'to protect wildlife and needs to be abandoned.
Second, it is difficult to change community attitudes toward
wildlife and raise substantial and long-term interest in conservation among
them. This is the case especially in situations where there are many
uncertainties associated with wildlife and its market, and where many of
the species to be conserved are at the same time perceived as enemies of the
people-damaging crops on which the communities' economies depend,
injuring and killing people, and thus sinking them deeper into poverty.
CWM is expected to succeed only in areas with big populations of wildlife,
big unsettled and uncultivated lands, and small, economically less
stratified human populations. Large wildlife populations mean big
conservation costs to the communities. Also, bigger communities imply
increased stratification and smaller program benefits to households and
individuals-a disincentive for them to participate.
Given the tendency of people in a (large) group setting to "freeride," the fact that most wildlife revenues go to hunting and tourist
companies, and that local elites reap most of the small percentage destined
for the communities, community members are discouraged from participatingin CWM programs. Not surprisingly, even where at least the "official"
program focus is on people's welfare, still a bigger proportion of the little
revenues reaching the communities is used for wildlife protection and
management. Also, there is a high element of altruism in CWM. But with
the integration of communities into the global economy, even in the most
remote communities people are increasingly becoming reluctant to use
their personal or individual resources to produce public goods. And
because CWM is externally funded and supervised, a sense of ownership
of it is seriously lacking.
Third, many contemporary rural communities in Africa have lost
their traditional institutions. Where they still exist they are fragmented,
weak and/or in conflict with formal institutions. The communities have
also lost the wildlife knowledge their ancestors had accumulated before
they were ordered to take their hands off wildlife, forcibly relocated from
wildlife areas, and made to change roles from legal harvesters of wildlife
to criminals. But where the wildlife knowledge still exists, it is useless and
irrelevant in terms of the current wildlife conservation problems.
The fences-and-fines approach is now perceived to have failed to
protect wildlife in Africa. But its poor performance has been a result of the
lucrative market for wild animals and their body parts in affluent countries,
declining state budgets for wildlife protection, under-staffing of protected
areas, and low morale and wages for those staff. Other reasons include
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corruption in government ranks, rising rural populations accompanied by
habitat destruction, a weakening of the state, changes in political systems
and sometimes violent changes of government, tribal conflicts, and civil
wars. Also, it has failed because its focus is on protecting what is inside of
protected areas, forgetting what is happening outside their boundaries.
Although there is a need to address issues outside of the protected areas to
conserve wildlife, CWM does not address, let alone resolve, many of these
problems.
Though unlikely, where and if communities manage to become
financially sustainable, they may solve the problems of funding and wages
for their scouts because wildlife will be "paying its way." They may also
solve the problem of under-staffing because each will protect its own area.
But they do not have access to required ecological information and are
completely unable to address many of the other problems. In short they do
not have the required expertise (wildlife knowledge and management
skills), experience, or the means to manage wildlife sustainably in the
existing, increasingly complex situation.
Fourth, CWM tries to reconcile the unreconcilable. Rural development may be reconciled with conservation of natural resources such as
water and forests because these do not cause any harm to the people. In
fact, where used properly, they are the ingredients of sustainable development. As pointed out earlier, African wildlife is different. It is a potential
resource to be utilized, but at the same time it is the source of the many
problems rural communities there are facing. Not surprisingly, some see
its elimination as a gain rather than a loss for economic advancement.
Two main outcomes-maintenance of wildlife habitats and
preservation of species, and improved socio-economic well-being of the
communities-are expected from CWM. But, as stated by proponents of the
approach, "success is measured in terms of ecological objectives, such as
reduced poaching or increased animal populations." 3 It is hardly possible
to increase populations of destructive species and still put the farmers first.
Even if wildlife in Africa were not causing problems to local communities,
the actual goals of conservationists and those of the communities are
different, if not impossible to reconcile. It is unlikely that wildlife management by the communities triggers off economic activities that are compatible with the protection of wildlife. Possibly that is why almost all CWM
programs continue to depend on donor funding and there is not a single
case of a program that has been reported to be financially sustainable.
The discrepancy between required and prevailing conditions may
be difficult to remove. For instance, it is difficult to get the governments to
change protectionist wildlife policies and laws. But this has been achieved
253. LIVING WITH WILDuFE, supra note 17, at 2.
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to various degrees in countries such as Zimbabwe and Kenya, although in
some cases lobbyists had to use "the back door" to achieve their objectives,
and in many the changes have been incomplete.' The process of institution building at the community level and of achieving meaningful
participation is difficult and slow, and may take longer than the period
estimated for the implementation of a community-based program.
However, some factors cannot be changed. For instance, it is
impossible to change the behavior of wildlife species. What can be done in
this respect is to restrict the movements and activities of either the
community members or wildlife by fencing. Market-led economic
development is believed to be led by an invisible hand that controls the
demand and supply of goods and services. In the present situation it seems
impossible to prevent the integration of rural communities into the wider
national and global economies. Striking a balance between wildlife
conservation and community economic development also seems an
impossible task. Therefore, CWM may work only in some areas and
communities, and even then only temporarily.
What are the implications of these findings for the management of
CWM programs? According to McCall and Skutsch and Patton and
Sawicki, a program's failure may largely be a result of one of two things.2
First is failure or inability of program implementers to implement it as per
design.z ' Patton and Sawicki call this program failure.'" Sometimes a
program can be implemented as designed and still fail. They call this
design theory failure, by which they mean failure of the theory to take into
account important factors that may influence program outcomes. s
However, it may be difficult to separate program failure caused by "poor"
implementation from that caused by the theoretical underpinnings of
CWM, because the former can still be a result of lack or loss of commitment
by the state and/or its agencies, or the communities, incapability of the
communities, and/or incompatibility between wildlife conservation and
rural economic development.
Studies reporting the (potential) failure of CWM programs often
blame the implementers for such failure, in particular by not adhering to
prescribed designs. Seldom have failures been associated with the
theoretical underpinnings of CWM. Often, the approach itself has been
beyond reproach. But the widespread skepticism and reluctance by African

254. See Western, supra note 9, at 30; Metcalfe, supra note 73, at 166.

255. See CARL V. PATTON &DAVID S.SAWICKI, BASIC METHODS OF POLICY ANALYSIS AND
PLANNING 36, 302 (1986); McCall & Skutsch, supra note 83, at 262-67.
256. See PATRON & SAWICKI, supra note 255, at 36,302.
257. See id. at 302.
258. See id.

Summer 2000]

COMMUNflY-BASED WILDUFE MANAGEMENT

643

governments to commit themselves to the approach is not the fault of
implementers of individual programs. Neither can implementers or the
design of programs be blamed for the ambivalence shown by some
proponents of the approach, the lack of expertise within the communities,

the incompatibility between the two elements of the approach, and, to a
large extent, the lack of interest shown by the communities.
Another implication of these findings is the need for proponents
of CWM to reconsider the assumptions underlying the approach, or the
approach itself. As these assumptions are highly problematic, the approach
seems unrealistic in most cases, and alternatives (perhaps ideologically less
appealing, but more realistic) need to be considered before it is too late.
One of these alternatives may be the Community Conservation Services
approach. CCS appears to be more realistic as it does not require governments to devolve ownership and management responsibilities for wildlife
or communities to actively manage wildlife, but takes into consideration
the needs and aspiration of the communities. Alternatively, the fences-andfines approach could be revisited to see whether it could be made to
address poaching more effectively, for instance, by ensuring that the main
beneficiaries (tourists and tourist operators) bear the costs of protecting the
wildlife.

